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PREFACE 
t has always been clear that technology will play a decisive role in 
addressing the challenges of climate change. Ultimately, the 
stabilisation of GHG emissions can only be met by an accelerated 
deployment of low-carbon and highly energy-efficient technologies and the 
development of new breakthrough technologies, in line with the objective 
set out in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and 
reiterated more concretely by the Cancún agreements. But the importance 
of technology goes beyond the remit of climate change. Meeting the 
ambitious goals of the new EU 2020 economic growth strategy will also 
require the development, demonstration and deployment of low-carbon 
technologies at a higher rate than is currently taking place. As early as 2006, 
the European Commission launched a debate on new tools to make this 
happen with the publication of the first Communication on the so-called 
Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan. By 2010, the SET-Plan had been 
approved by member states, yet crucial elements of it are still to be decided, 
including funding.  
Against this background, CEPS brought together a Task Force, which 
I had the pleasure and privilege to chair, representing a broad range of 
industries, business associations and non-governmental environmental 
organisations to engage in extensive discussions, often at senior executive 
level. During the meetings, the members also had ample opportunity to 
discuss these issues with officials from the EU institutions, member states 
and international organisations. The objective was to assess ongoing EU 
policy discussions and provide expert input into them, but also to share 
knowledge and understanding among different stakeholders, and to draw 
up a set of conclusions and recommendations.  
As readers consider these conclusions and recommendations, I urge 
them to reflect on the importance of the underlying question of how to 
accelerate the rate of low-carbon technologies in an economically efficient 
way in today’s market. This is a challenge that goes beyond EU borders. 
Different parts of the world will find different answers to this same 
question.  
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Discussions were always rich, the debate was at times intense and I 
believe that this Task Force has made a constructive contribution to this 
important debate. I would like to thank the members of the Task Force for 
their active and positive contributions throughout the meetings, and 
especially for the many written contributions that have been submitted. 
Although each member endorses the general content of the report, one 
should not conclude that all members subscribe to every sentence of the 
text. Finally, my thanks go to the CEPS’ research team, which has led the 
efforts to draft this report.  
 
 
Lars-Erik Liljelund 
Chair of the CEPS Task Force  
Chief Executive Officer, Foundation for Strategic Environmental 
Research (MISTRA) Sweden 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
ealising both the EU’s climate change objectives of 2020 and beyond 
and the ambitions of the Europe 2020 economic growth agenda will 
require the development, demonstration and deployment of new 
low-carbon technologies at a faster rate than is currently taking place. EU 
policies to make this happen have been or are being put in place. At the 
core of the climate and energy agenda is the 2008 Climate and Energy 
Package, notably the flagship legislation on renewable energy and, most 
important, the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), designed to provide 
market pull. Alongside these initiatives, the EU has launched the Strategic 
Energy Technology (SET) Plan, essentially to promote low-carbon energy 
technologies. Approved by the member states, the SET-Plan has been in 
operation since 2010. Yet important decisions are still to be taken, with 
financing being one of them.  
This CEPS Task Force Report examines the case for government 
intervention to support low-carbon energy technologies, in addition to 
carbon pricing. In a second section, it identifies the potential role for the 
EU, notably where it can add value to member state activities before 
identifying financial needs and the tools with which to meet them. The 
analysis then concentrates on the content of this EU framework, focusing 
on issues such as governance, finance needs, (new) sources of finance and 
the positive impact that the consistency and coherence of other EU policies 
with SET-Plan objectives can bring about.  
I.  Key Messages 
General 
1.  The acceleration of the development, demonstration and especially 
the deployment of low-carbon technologies is a precondition for the 
EU to reach its short- and longer-term climate change objectives, as 
well as to successfully implement its Europe 2020 economic growth 
strategy. This will require economic framework conditions that 
adequately reflect the costs of security of energy supply and climate 
R2 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
change. Other types of impact will also have to be taken into account, 
such as policy frameworks, regulation and infrastructure. This 
includes an efficient and truly competitive integrated EU energy 
market, the necessary grid infrastructure and accompanying cross-
border regulation, and will provide market pull for low-carbon 
technologies. While the ETS aims at providing such signals for the 
industry and power sectors outside the ETS, no such signals exist yet 
for many sectors.  
In parallel to this market pull there is also the need for a ‘technology 
push’, i.e. support in the areas of R&D, demonstration and deployment. 
The EU’s technological ambitions will only work if they are accompanied 
by necessary resources. 
2.  The EU is not alone in this field. Other countries such as China, 
Japan, South Korea and the US are also pursuing ambitious industrial 
strategies in low-carbon energy. For Europe to be a beneficiary in the 
low-carbon market, rather than just a consumer of technologies 
developed elsewhere, there is no alternative to putting innovation at 
the heart of its growth strategy. A successful industrial policy in low-
carbon energy is also essential if Europe wants to preserve political 
influence in the area of climate change. 
SET-Plan 
3.  It is important to define the role of government intervention and the 
role of the EU carefully. This CEPS Task Force Report has identified a 
need for public intervention if : 
(a)  Market and financial risks are too high for a private investor, 
i.e. benefits are realised beyond the period in which a private 
investor requires a pay-back;  
(b)  Technology risks are too high, i.e. if large-scale technologies 
carry a high risk of failure, for example at demonstration or 
early deployment level;  
(c)  Traditional energy technologies have an advantage over some 
new ones if the infrastructure for existing technologies is paid 
off or if regulation provides disincentives to invest; 
(d)  A market failure exists, i.e. the real costs to society of some 
existing technologies are not internalised because of subsidies THE SET-PLAN | 3 
 
or because a technology does not pay its full cost, giving 
existing technologies an advantage over new ones; and 
(e)  Investment in RD&I (research, development and innovation) is 
not rewarded by the market because the technology becomes 
freely available before a private investor can make a profit from 
it. 
4.  The SET-Plan, notably through its current governance framework, 
has the potential to accelerate the rate of innovation by bringing 
together the innovation capabilities of the academic and corporate 
sectors. EU support can: 
(a)  Increase collaboration among different technology developers 
and increase economies of scale, including cross-border 
infrastructure such as the grid;  
(b)  Provide the incentives to invest in projects that are too costly for 
individual member stats but have high European value added; 
(c)  Reduce the risks of duplication of efforts and;  
(d)  If properly designed, increase the leverage effect of EU financial 
support, raising the aggregate level of R&D and innovation in 
Europe for SET-Plan priority technologies. 
5.  It is important that the SET-Plan governing bodies, which include the 
European Commission, member states and industry, assume the role 
to facilitate, accelerate and drive forward low-carbon technology 
development, demonstration and deployment at EU level. This will 
mean a particular leadership role for the European Commission 
regarding those technologies with important cross-border 
implications or with EU-wide scale effects. A leading EU role is 
particularly indicated if the EU:  
(a)  Can capture the full technology capacity within the EU; 
(b)  Address technology projects that are too big for any one 
member state or require coordinated actions between member 
states to provide value;  
(c)  Cope with the risks associated with new and untested 
technologies and avoid the risk of duplicating national or 
regional initiatives implemented in an un-coordinated fashion; 
(d)  Build upon the ‘Innovation Union’ by improving co-operation 
and co-ordination on low-carbon technologies.  4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Possible examples could be (smart) grids, carbon capture and 
storage, transport electrification and nuclear energy. For all SET-Plan 
technologies, the European Commission’s role will be one of 
facilitation and coordination to ensure that member state efforts are 
compatible and, ideally, mutually reinforcing; avoiding duplication, 
spreading best practice across the EU and ensuring the inclusion of 
all member states and regions.  
6.  There are major differences across technologies or technology clusters 
in relation to the nature of barriers, which depend on the maturity of 
the technology. This will require tailor-made support in line with 
technological needs. For energy policy to promote new and advanced 
energy technologies effectively, it is vital that policy-makers 
recognize the different requirements at each technology readiness 
level. There are big differences between: proven technologies that show 
potential for commercial deployment in a competitive environment, which 
may require mandates permitting support and stable long-term 
measures, and proven technologies that are not yet commercially 
competitive, which require funding for demonstration and transitional 
incentives. These technologies require quite different policy 
measures. Early on in the technology development cycle where we 
have unproven technologies with significant research and development still 
required R&D support is essential for underpinning science. 
7.  While there are large benefits in terms of collaboration and 
coordination within the SET-Plan framework, the need for an increase 
in the level of R&D investment in Europe, including from the public 
sector, is undoubted. The fact that public budgeted resources at EU 
and member state level are scarce will require greater use of EU 
financial engineering instruments. This is most important in the so-
called ‘bridge financing’ areas to prevent technologies with a high 
European added value and positive long-term economic rates of 
return from dying off in the early stages of development due to 
market and financial risks and the generally long lead time to 
commercial deployment. The EU can provide financial support 
through tailored combinations of grants and loans. The EU has 
already successfully established the Risk-Sharing Financial Facility 
(RSFF) in the area of RD&I to provide debt financing for loans to 
RD&I demonstration and deployment projects. This instrument can 
be a model for energy specific RD&I investments. THE SET-PLAN | 5 
 
8.  The SET-Plan does not operate in a vacuum and it is important that 
the technologies developed for the future encounter the right market 
and infrastructure conditions for their deployment. At the same time, 
policy coherence at EU and national levels with SET-Plan priorities 
will need to provide additional leverage to SET-Plan technologies. 
Key areas identified in this report are regional policy, state aid policy 
and especially public procurement, which is an underexploited tool 
to boost the deployment of low-carbon technologies.  
9.  While demonstration and deployment are at the heart of the SET-Plan 
strategy, making the SET-Plan a success will also require the review 
and reform of rules for EU research projects to stem the declining 
participation of industry. The successful promotion of collaboration 
between industry, including SMEs and academia via Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP) will require, among other things, a modification of 
the rules on intellectual property rights for collaborative projects, 
which do not reflect the concerns of industry or the often mixed 
public and commercial interests of academic institutes. Bureaucracy, 
both in the pre-formulation and implementation phases, has been 
identified as another shortcoming. This latter point and proposals for 
reform have also been identified by the Carvalho Report1 from the 
European Parliament.  
II.  Recommendations: How to make the SET-Plan a success 
The Task Force has formulated the following recommendations:  
1.  The SET-Plan policy must ensure the right economic and regulatory 
framework conditions to foster low-carbon technology development, 
demonstration and deployment. These must include:  
(a)  A truly integrated and competitive energy market, including 
the necessary cross-border infrastructure and appropriate 
regulation, and 
                                                      
1  Among other recommendations, the Carvalho Report (European Parliament, 
2010) calls for the elimination of cumbersome unproductive procedures and the 
need to simplify and streamline the multitude of programmes and instruments. 6 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
(b)  Energy prices that adequately reflect the costs of security of 
energy supply, climate change, the environment or other social 
impacts.  
2.  In parallel, the EU and member states must support the technology 
(push) by addressing specific non-market barriers to RD&I, 
demonstration and deployment. 
3.  Those governing the SET-Plan, namely the European Commission, 
member states and industry, must go beyond declarations of intent 
and accept responsibility to drive forward low-carbon technology 
development, demonstration and deployment at EU level.  
4.  The European Commission should lead in areas with important 
cross-border or scale effects, notably (smart) grids, carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) and nuclear energy.  
5.  For all SET-Plan technologies, the European Commission should help 
facilitate member state efforts to ensure compatibility, avoid 
duplication, spread best practice across the EU and ensure inclusion 
of all member states and regions. 
6.  The EU must ensure a higher level of financial intervention, including 
a higher EU budget allocation. This must include: 
(a)  Higher levels of grant funding for basic research and early 
stages of demonstration, and especially  
(b)  ‘Bridge financing’ to cover technological, market and financial 
risk in the demonstration and early deployment phase.  
7.  In particular, the EU should envisage setting up appropriate risk-
sharing instruments, building on the success of the Risk Sharing 
Finance Facility (RSFF), probably based on a Portfolio First Loss Piece 
approach to ease the provision of (bridge) financing to facilitate the 
market deployment of unexploited new technologies. 
8.  The SET-Plan should also  
(a)  Promote the idea that the Cohesion and Structural Funds are 
used to finance infrastructures which are appropriate for SET-
Plan technologies; 
(b)  Bring EU procurement rules in line with the EU objectives to 
promote new low-carbon energy technologies and energy 
efficiency;  THE SET-PLAN | 7 
 
(c)  Align EU state aid rules to allow member states to support 
national investments in energy RD&I to the same extent as EU 
projects. This should especially be so when national 
investments have an important European added value (based 
on Article 107 3(b)of the Treaty);  
(d)  Include a review and reform of financial and control rules for 
initiatives in the area of RD&I, such as for the EU Research 
Framework Programme in line with recommendations of the 
Carvalho Report of the European Parliament, with a particular 
focus on bureaucracy; and 
(e)  Address the issue of IPR rules to give proper incentives for 
industry and SMEs to participate in EU research programmes.  
 8 | 
INTRODUCTION  
echnology has moved centre stage within the arena of climate change 
policy. While there may be different views on whether stabilisation 
of GHG emissions in line with the UNFCCC’s objective can be 
achieved with technically proven technology, the need to bring carbon-
efficient technologies to the market at scale more quickly is undisputed. 
Also uncontested is the need to develop, demonstrate and deploy as yet 
unproven technologies, in order to reach climate change targets beyond 
2050.  
Significant efforts have been made by the European Union to give 
shape to a “technology pillar of the EU’s energy and climate policy” to 
create “a blueprint for Europe to develop a world-class portfolio of 
affordable, clean, efficient and low emission energy technologies” by 
developing the Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan, in the European 
Commission’s words. Approved by the member states, the SET-Plan “lays 
out the EU’s strategy to accelerate the development of these technologies 
and to bring them more quickly to the market.” This acknowledges that 
“the development of resource-efficient and green technologies will be a 
major driver of growth” as was outlined in the Commission’s May 2010 
Communication on the implications of Copenhagen. In the context of the 
SET-Plan, the December 3rd Energy Council reiterated that “future financial 
perspectives should provide adequate support for the Union’s activities in 
the field of innovation and technology”. The European Council of 4 
February 2011 confirmed that the “EU and its Member States will promote 
investment in renewables and safe and sustainable low carbon technologies 
and focus on implementing the technology priorities established in the 
European Strategic Energy Technology plan.”2  Priority 4 of the Energy 
                                                      
2 Item 10 of the European Council Conclusions of 4 February 2011 reads as follows: 
“The EU and its Member States will promote investment in renewables and safe 
and sustainable low carbon technologies and focus on implementing the 
technology priorities established in the European Strategic Energy Technology 
plan. The Commission is invited to table new initiatives on smart grids, including 
those linked to the development of clean vehicles, energy storage, sustainable bio 
fuels and energy saving solutions for cities.” 
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Strategy 2020 calls for the EU to extend its leadership in energy technology 
and innovation against competition in international technology markets in 
particular from the US, China, South Korea and Japan.  
The SET-Plan represents the paradigm shift “going well beyond the 
narrow domain of R&D and innovation policy” by combining the “market 
for innovative goods and services, focused resources, new financial 
structures and mobility of people, money and organisations”, which was 
demanded as early as 2006 in the report by the Independent Expert Group 
on R&D,3 chaired by the former Prime Minister of Finland, Esko Aho and 
entitled “Creating an Innovative Europe”.  
This CEPS Task Force Report and its accompanying policy 
recommendations are intended to serve as a contribution to the ongoing EU 
discussions in a number of strategic areas such as the EU’s growth strategy, 
the EU’s role in climate change policy and the new EU budget.  
The report is structured in four chapters. Chapter 1 establishes the 
context both from a political and technological perspective and presents the 
economic and strategic case for supporting the SET-Plan. Chapter 2 
examines the financial challenges and the potential financial instruments to 
be deployed to reach the SET-Plan objectives, from straightforward grants 
to more complex financial engineering systems. Chapter 3 analyses the 
framework conditions, including management of RD&I, coherence of and 
synergies with other EU policies and state aid policy. The report sums up 
with concluding remarks in Chapter 4. 
The main findings of the report are contained in the Executive 
Summary with Key Messages and Recommendations.  
The report has three annexes, the first of which contains a glossary of 
technical terms and abbreviations used; the second contains information on 
the financial development needs for SET-Plan Technologies, and the third a 
list of members of the Task Force and invited guests and speakers.  
The report uses the term RD&I (Research Development and 
Innovation) rather than R&D, to broaden its scope beyond basic research. 
The SET-Plan largely focuses on later stages of technology development 
and innovation, mainly demonstration and deployment. 
                                                      
3 See the European Commission website (http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/ 
action/2006_ahogroup_en.htm). 10 | 
 
 
1.  THE SET-PLAN: A PILLAR OF EU 
CLIMATE CHANGE, ENERGY AND 
GROWTH STRATEGIES  
or many years, the EU has been leading international efforts in 
domestic and international climate change, for example by setting 
unilateral targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions or renewables 
for 2020, by policy innovation such as the EU Emissions Trading System 
( E T S )  o r  b y  t h e  d e c i s i o n  a i m i n g  t o  limit the temperature increase to a 
maximum of 2°C as early as 1996. While the outcome of the Copenhagen 
negotiations in 2009 was a disappointment, nevertheless, the Cancún 
Agreements mark the first time that all major economies have not only 
pledged explicit actions under the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, but have also formally agreed to limit the average global warming 
to below 2°C.  
While this constitutes progress in its own right, it also means the 
attention is irrevocably shifting to technology policy, i.e. how to accelerate 
the development, demonstration and, most important, the deployment of 
low-carbon technologies.4 Creating a global economy that emits a fraction 
of its current GHG emissions will not only require wholesale change in the 
ways economies are structured, but more importantly an unprecedented 
innovation drive in the EU and beyond. This is especially true for the 
energy producing and consuming sectors, which are responsible for up to 
80% of total GHG emissions.  
                                                      
4 The current US Ambassador to the EU has even proposed that EU-US relations be 
transformed into a transatlantic “Partnership for Innovation” with technology at its 
heart. See Kennard (2010). 
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By adopting the climate and energy package in 2008-09, the EU has 
put in place a comprehensive policy framework, including a GHG 
reduction target of -20% compared to 1990, renewable energy targets for a 
20% share of renewables in primary energy and a streamlined and 
centralised EU-ETS that not only imposes a carbon price but also requires 
that emissions in the sector covered decrease by 1.74% per annum as of 
2013. Internationally, the EU aspires to achieve a legally binding 
comprehensive global agreement that makes it possible to reduce GHG 
emissions globally by 50% in 2050, translating into a reduction by the EU of 
the order of 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990, as was confirmed by the 
European Council on 4 February 2011. The EU “low carbon roadmap” 
(European Commission, 2011) published in March 2011 judges that a cost-
effective and gradual transition to the 2050 objective requires reductions of 
25% in 2020, 40% in 2030 and 60% in 2040, compared to 1990. New energy 
technologies will also be essential to address energy challenges, including 
import dependency, price volatility or unsustainable resource use.5  
Production and trade in high-value added sectors, which include 
energy technology, are basic elements of economic growth and 
sustainability. The SET-Plan is an integral part of the “Innovation Union” 
strategy launched by the European Commission in October 2010, and key 
to the elements that will drive Europe’s growth potential as estimated in 
the Europe 2020 Communication. A successful SET-Plan holds the promise 
for Europe to achieve its technological and political ambitions in the key 
areas of energy and climate change policy, affecting its economic prospects 
and its role at international level. There is consensus now that the economic 
growth, welfare and competitiveness of the EU will depend on the EU’s 
success in developing, deploying and competing in new low-carbon 
                                                      
5 The Energy 2020 Communication of the European Commission identifies the SET-
Plan as a key instrument for the EU to reach its objectives. It argues that “without a 
technological shift, the EU will fail on its 2050 ambitions to decarbonise the 
electricity and transport sectors”, and states that “development and demonstration 
projects for the main technologies (second generation biofuels, smart grids, smart 
cities and intelligent networks, Carbon Capture and Storage, electricity storage and 
electro-mobility, next generation nuclear, renewable heating and cooling) must be 
speeded up” and “the urgency of bringing new high performance low-carbon 
technologies to the European markets is more acute than ever.” (pp. 14 -15). 12 | THE SET-PLAN: A PILLAR OF EU CLIMATE CHANGE, ENERGY AND GROWTH STRATEGIES 
 
technologies. The SET-Plan has therefore become the nucleus of a new EU 
industrial policy for the low-carbon age. 
Low-carbon technologies are becoming the focus of industrial policies 
around the globe. Other countries such as China, Japan, South Korea and 
the US are pursuing ambitious industrial strategies in energy due to the 
rising demand for new low-carbon technologies. For Europe to be a key 
player in this market, rather than just a consumer, it needs to put 
innovation at the top of the agenda, not just in word but also in deed. If the 
EU fails to innovate, competitors such as China and the US will quickly 
surpass the EU in its technological capacity on low-carbon technologies. 
Single member states would not be able to counter such a development.  
1.1  The EU long-term research, demonstration and innovation 
agenda  
Against this background the EU has developed the SET-Plan with its 
special focus on a long-term energy research, demonstration and 
innovation agenda for Europe to make low-carbon technologies affordable 
and competitive and thereby enable market uptake to meet the EU 2020 
targets, as well as to realise its 2050 vision of a low-carbon economy. 
The European Commission has identified goalposts6 for progress in 
technology development, demonstration and deployment that would be 
required to meet the 2020 targets as set out by the EU climate and energy 
package and accompanying legislation, as well as the longer-term vision of 
a low-carbon economy by 2050. Goalposts for the next ten years to achieve 
for 2020 targets include to:  
•  make sustainably produced second-generation biofuels competitive 
with fossil fuels, 
•  enable the commercial use of CCS technologies, 
•  double the power generation capacity of the largest wind turbines, 
•  demonstrate the commercial readiness of large-scale photovoltaic and 
concentrated solar power, 
•  enable a single, smart European electricity grid able to integrate 
renewable and decentralised energy sources,  
                                                      
6  European Commission Brochure “EU SET-Plan – Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan”,  pp. 4-5. THE SET-PLAN | 13 
 
•  bring to a mass market more efficient conversion and end-use devices 
and systems and 
•  maintain competitiveness in fission technologies, together with long-
term waste management solutions.  
In relation to the 2050 visions of a low-carbon economy, critical 
goalposts for the European Commission are to:  
•  bring the next generation of renewable energy technologies to market 
competitiveness, 
•  achieve a breakthrough in the cost efficiency of (electric) energy 
storage technologies, 
•  develop the technologies and create the conditions to enable industry 
to commercialise hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, 
•  complete the preparations for the demonstration of a new generation 
of fission reactors, 
•  complete the construction of the ITER fusion facility, 
•  elaborate alternative visions and transition strategies towards the 
development of the future trans-European energy networks and 
•  achieve breakthroughs in enabling research for energy efficiency. 
The strategy focuses on the so-called ‘industrial initiatives’ on all 
seven key technology clusters, recognising the key role of industrial 
participation. See Box 1.1. 
 
Box 1.1. EU Industrial Initiatives 
European Industrial Bioenergy Initiative (EIBI) (launched 15 November 
2010) 
European Sustainable Nuclear Industrial Initiative (ESNII) (launched 15 
November 2010) 
Wind European Industrial Initiative (WEII) (launched 3 June 2010) 
Solar Europe Industry Initiative (SEII) (launched 3 June 2010) 
Solar Thermal Electricity European Industrial Initiative (STE-EII) (launched 
3 June 2010) 
The European Electricity Grid Initiative (EEGI) (launched 3 June 2010) 
Carbon Capture and Storage European Industrial Initiative (CCS-EII) 
(launched 3 June 2010) 
Smart Cities European Industrial Initiative (EII) (to be launched during 2011) 14 | THE SET-PLAN: A PILLAR OF EU CLIMATE CHANGE, ENERGY AND GROWTH STRATEGIES 
 
The SET-Plan outline was first presented in 2006 and then further 
developed in 2007, 2009 and 2010. 7  The technology roadmap (2009b) 
presents a detailed description up to 2020 of the financial requirements and 
areas of research. The SET-Plan was approved and officially started in 2010, 
although many of its elements still need to be decided upon.  
The SET-Plan aims to build a platform of cooperation across Europe 
to promote collaboration between technology developers (academic and 
industry corporate) and the public sector on the European scale. This 
should result in important economies of scale, a reduction in the 
duplication of efforts and a leveraging of RD&I investments in the private 
sector. This cooperation is as important as the public financial package that 
should accompany it.  
It is governed by the SET-Plan Steering Group (SET-Group) 
comprising high-level representatives from the EU member states, chaired 
by the European Commission. Norway, Switzerland and Turkey 
participate as observers. Its essential mission is to manage the SET-Plan 
process and thereby facilitate and drive implementation. 
The SET-Plan also establishes the EIIs, which are an industrial policy 
version of the more academically focused European Technology Platforms 
(ETPs) and Knowledge and Innovation Communities (KICs) which form 
the research backbone of the European Research Area (ERA). Ten leading 
European research institutes have taken up this ‘low-carbon window’ of a 
new EU approach to technology and industrial policy by founding an 
                                                      
7  EC (2006): Communication, Towards a European Strategic Energy Technology 
Plan, 847, Brussels, 10 January; EC (2007): Communication on a Renewable Energy 
Road Map, Renewable energies in the 21st century: Building a more sustainable 
future, 848 final, Brussels, 10 January; European Commission (2009a): 
Communication on Investing in the Development of Low Carbon Technologies 
(SET-Plan), 519 final, Brussels, 7 October; EC (2009b): A technology Roadmap, 
Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication on 
Investing in the Development of Low Carbon Technologies (SET-Plan), 519 final, 
Brussels, 7 October; EC (2009c): R&D investment in the priority technologies of the 
European Strategic Energy Technology Plan, Commission Staff Working 
Document accompanying the Communication on Investing in the Development of 
Low Carbon Technologies (SET-Plan), 519 final, Brussels, 7 October; EC (2010): 
2020 Communication, Europe 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, 3 March 2010 (http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/). THE SET-PLAN | 15 
 
European Energy Research Alliance (EERA). The objective of the EERA is 
to accelerate the development of new energy technologies by conceiving 
and implementing Joint Research Programmes in support of the SET-Plan, 
by pooling and integrating activities and resources, combining national and 
Community sources of funding and maximising complementarities and 
synergies. 
This institutional framework is also accompanied by SETIS (Strategic 
Energy Technology Information System), which is an information system to 
support decision-making by providing information on RD&I performed in 
Europe, and mapping the capacities available in each area of research. It 
gives companies, academic institutions and the public sector a view of what 
RD&I is being carried out.  
1.2  Correcting market and policy failures 
Markets in general do not invite costly or high-risk – financial or 
technological – innovations, such as some low-carbon technologies. A more 
rapid deployment of low carbon technologies at the necessary rate to 
achieve EU targets will therefore require an adapted framework that 
provides incentives both for RD&I and market uptake. In reality, however, 
more efficient and low-carbon technologies are hindered by market policy 
failure, such as the lack of carbon pricing or the continued existence of 
fossil fuel subsidies.  
Fossil fuels benefit from a number of consumption subsidies. The IEA 
(2010) estimated consumption subsidies at $312 billion in 2009 (Figure 1.1), 
although they reached a peak at $558 billion in 2008 when oil prices were at 
their highest.8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
8 Note that this estimate has been criticised as not being adequate enough due to 
lack of data and the absence of commonly agreed standards to assess subsidies 
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Figure 1.1 Economic value of world fossil fuel consumption subsidies by type 
 
Source: OECD/IEA (2010, p. 579). 
In other cases, regulatory barriers (e.g. market structure, lack of 
carbon value, lack of access to funding) or a lack of skills (e.g. lack of 
capacity to install, maintain and operate technology, lack of independence 
on technology) may exist that hinder the development, demonstration and 
deployment of new low-carbon energy technologies. There is also an 
observed weak level of patenting in Europe (see Aghion et al., 2009) 
compared to other advanced economies. Other barriers and their potential 
remedies will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
1.3  Improving market pull  
The uptake of new low-carbon technologies can be accelerated, for example 
by making existing – high-carbon – technologies more expensive through 
taxes, cap-and-trade or regulation. Carbon pricing aims to internalise 
externalities and therefore make new and low-carbon technologies 
potentially profitable more quickly.  
The EU has chosen the ETS as a means of pricing carbon. The ETS is 
neutral as regards technology and leaves it to market participants to choose 
the most appropriate technology to use. For sectors not covered by the ETS, 
some member states have introduced national schemes, such as the UK’s 
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which also introduces a carbon price through energy use benchmarking 
and the auctioning of emission permits.9 
The higher the carbon price, the faster the deployment rate in low-
carbon technologies. However, often this does not do away with the 
disadvantages of new low-carbon technologies in the demonstration and 
early deployment phase (see Chapter 2 for a detailed analysis) or at least 
would require a very high carbon price, which could have other negative 
economic consequences and might not be politically feasible after all. But 
market pull goes beyond carbon pricing. Another important instrument is 
public procurement, which amounts to about 19.8% of EU GDP (retrieved 
from the Eurostat 2008 database10 for the EU27). Detailed data for energy-
related public procurement is not available. On the one hand, public 
procurement standards on energy use or CO2 emissions can give a major 
boost to the market penetration of low carbon technologies. Research 
procurement, on the other hand, can boost the R&D element of energy 
technologies.  
1.4  The role of technology push  
For areas that market pull instruments cannot address, technology push is 
required. For example, RD&I subsidies address the market failure of the 
lack of profitability of certain RD&I. Support for demonstration attempts to 
provide incentives for risky and typical large-scale technologies, which 
investors might otherwise shy away from even at the demonstration phase. 
Deployment support finally tries to finance the gap before a technology 
becomes profitable because it lacks scale or competes with technologies 
that benefit from existing infrastructures. 
The focus of support, i.e. RD&I, demonstration or deployment is 
technology-specific and depends on each technology, its specific barriers 
and notably the state of its development towards market maturity. While 
some technologies will require mostly RD&I support, others will call for 
                                                      
9   Another route, currently not chosen by the EU, would be by regulating 
technologies. Regulation provides a high degree of certainty for investors, yet 
provides fewer incentives to innovate on a continous basis. Once a technology 
standard is regulated, the regulatee has no incentive to go beyond that standard.  
10 See: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/ 
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support in demonstration and others in deployment. (See Chapter 2 for a 
more detailed discussion of this issue.)  
Attention to low-carbon technologies is typically concentrated on 
those with the highest potential to be successful in the market in the 
medium and long term. For details, see Box 1. It is likely that additional 
technologies will be added to this list over time as they mature.  
1.5  Why public support and what is the role of the EU? 
There is an emerging consensus that a large innovation drive in the energy 
sector to bring Europe onto the path to a low-carbon economy is unlikely to 
take place without a substantial additional public finance effort, either by 
the EU or member states or both (e.g. Aghion et al., 2009; European 
Commission, 2009b). Public support will be needed for a number of specific 
reasons. 
•  Benefits of energy technologies are often public rather than private 
and therefore not fully rewarded by the market. From a rational point 
of view the private operator will under-invest compared to a social 
optimum. 
•  Benefits and profits are often realised in the longer term only, which 
creates a disincentive to invest. The situation is aggravated where 
costs are very high. 
•  Many of the new technologies carry risks of failure, for example at 
demonstration or early deployment level, affecting the risk-reward 
ratio negatively.  
•  Some traditional energy technologies have an advantage over new 
ones as the infrastructure is already there or as regulation 
discourages new investments. This favours ‘traditional’ technologies 
over new ones, cementing a certain technological path (‘path 
dependency’). 
•  The real costs to society of some existing technologies are not 
internalised, giving them an advantage over new ones, constituting a 
market failure (e.g. lack of internalisation of the full cost of emissions).  
Given these factors, the next question is what EU action is 
appropriate to bring low-carbon technologies to the market more quickly? 
EU action is typically legitimate if it generates economies of scale or in the 
case of – positive or negative – externalities. Politically, EU-level action can 
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open for the different regions of the EU. In addition to the subsidiarity 
proof, as to the SET-plan, the case for EU action rests on the following 
fundamental arguments.  
Generally, the EU will be in a position to drive forward low-carbon 
technologies because it can:  
•  capture the full technology capacity within the EU;  
•  address technology projects that are too big for any one member state 
or require coordinated actions between member states to provide 
value; 
•  cope with the risks associated with new and untested technologies 
and avoid the risk of duplicating national or regional initiatives 
implemented in an uncoordinated fashion; and 
•  build upon the ‘Innovation Union’ by improving cooperation and 
coordination on low-carbon technologies.  
This does not necessarily mean that the EU will always lead in all 
areas. In most cases, the EU will have a subordinate role, for example as 
coordinator to ensure that national efforts are compatible within the EU 
and avoid duplication. However, there are areas that are characterised by 
cross-border effects (externalities) and represent a massive scale where an 
EU leading role is warranted, i.e. (smart) grids, carbon capture, transport 
and storage technologies and nuclear energy. In all other technology areas, 
the EU’s added value will typically be through coordination, ensuring best-
practice or activating leverage funding.  
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2.  CLOSING THE EU FINANCING GAP 
FOR INNOVATION  
he European Commission’s SET-Plan documents claim that the EU is 
under-investing in new energy technologies, and has called for more 
than a doubling of funding for RD&I, from €3 billion per year today 
to €8 billion (total EU public and private expenditure) for the next decade. 
While increased public financing will be necessary, there is savings 
potential in better, more coordinated and more efficient use of resources, 
including efforts to increase the leverage effect to attract additional private 
investment, where possible. 
The average investment in energy RD&I for the Financial 
Perspectives is €720 million a year, of which €389 million is destined for the 
ITER project,11 (which is not under SET-Plan auspices). According to the 
Seville-based Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), one of 
the seven scientific institutes of the European Commission's Joint Research 
Centre (JRC)  (JRC-IPTS, 2009), the value of the EU intervention in the 
overall energy RD&I investment in Europe was 11% in 2007; approximately 
one third of the total public RD&I investment. 
The EU also injected €5 billion in funds for the energy sector with the 
economic recovery plan, half of which can be considered as finance for 
                                                      
11 ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) is an international research 
and engineering project that is currently building the world's largest and most advanced 
experimental nuclear fusion reactor, which is under construction at Cadarache in the south 
of France. The ITER tokamak aims to make the long awaited transition from today's studies 
of plasma physics to full scale electricity-producing fusion power plants. The project's 
members are the European Union, India, Japan, the People's Republic of China, Russia, 
South Korea and the United States. 
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demonstration and deployment in the areas of offshore wind and CCS. 
Nevertheless, the recovery plan was a one-off and a more sustainable 
funding programme needs to be established. 
Of the recovery plan, €146 m remained uncommitted. The European 
Parliament gave the go ahead to use the funds for renovations of public 
and private buildings to improve energy efficiency, as well as other urban 
energy efficiency projects. The funds will be allocated to a European 
Energy Efficiency Facility, which then will be given in the form of loans, 
guarantees, equity or other forms of financial support through financial 
intermediaries. € 20 million will, however, be allocated to technical 
assistance. The EIB will add €75 million to bring the total of the fund to be 
used for investments to at least €200 million. Other financial institutions at 
member state level have also been invited to contribute to and join the fund.  
The total size of the fund and the level of investment ultimately leveraged 
by it will only be clear once the additional investors are clear and 
investment portfolios are decided upon.  
However – even if necessary – just increasing the EU or national 
public budgets for RD&I in energy is not enough. Also, the usual EU 
budget operations on RD&I through the Framework Programmes are not 
suited to the big ambitions of Europe in the energy sector. More is needed, 
tailored to the different stages. The most important role of the EU budget 
may well be that of a catalyst, focusing on leverage, yet avoiding 
substituting existing or planned non-EU public or private funding. 
2.1  Expanding the leverage and multiplier effect of EU funds 
There is staunch resistance on the part of (many) member states to an 
increase in the size of the EU budget. Yet the EU budget can still have an 
impact on the rate of development of new technologies and necessary 
infrastructure. This can be realised in three ways: i) redistributing funds 
within the present envelope, i.e. a redefinition of priorities; ii) improving 
the efficiency of expenditures, i.e. ‘more value for the same money’; iii) 
increasing the effectiveness of the budget operations and the development 
of instruments, i.e. by increasing the leverage and the multiplier effect of the 
operations. The leverage effect is the additional funding raised from the 
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here to be the effectiveness of operations, thus their capacity to generate 
markets that grow sustainably after the completion of the projects. 
2.2  Bridge financing  
Costs, time lags and risk are hampering the transposition of research 
results into commercially viable and profitable technologies in the market. 
Blending grants and loans via appropriate financial engineering can 
generate the bridge financing necessary to reduce the risk profile for 
private investors, i.e. the support needed to bring a newly developed but 
untested technology to the market and ensuring its deployment.12 
2.2.1  Blending tools for bridge financing 
As basic research and testing are usually covered by research grants, there 
is typically a gap to viability and successful deployment, sometimes called 
the ‘technology death-risk area’.13 The timescale, cost and risk level for each 
technology will determine the existence and size of the ‘technology death 
risk-area’ – an area where venture capital cannot be raised without 
government support. In this twilight zone, where a product has the long-
term potential to be profitable but is commercially not viable in the short 
term, so that additional support is required to leverage sufficient private 
capital by reducing the risk involved for private investors. The European 
Investment Fund (EIF), in co-operation with other financial institutions is 
becoming a key actor in the field of developing new instruments for the 
valorisation of IPR such IP funds. It complements the role of the EIF in 
technology transfer operations. 
Bankable demonstration projects belonging to the SET-plan promoted 
by investment grade entities could gain access to standard loans from the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), which is able to finance up to 50% of the 
investment cost. When the risk profile of the operation increases, and to 
achieve an efficient use of existing funding resources, blending grant and 
loan mechanisms in a way tailored to the technology might be a valuable 
option. Financial engineering tools can increase the bankability of 
investments in new technologies by reducing costs and risk. The optimal 
                                                      
12 The needs vary according to the technology so it is unlikely there will be a single 
response for each case.  
13 Typically called the  ‘valley of death’. THE SET-PLAN | 23 
 
mix of funding sources changes with market maturity and technological 
development. They include blending (mixing grants and loans), risk-
sharing arrangements and loan guarantees, or long-term loans. 
Figure 2.1. Technology cycle and financial needs  
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
2.2.2  Balancing grants and loans 
Blending loans and grants can take a number of forms, where the EU offers 
financial assistance that does not need to be reimbursed, combined with 
other financial support that may be in the form of loans, debt financing or 
guarantees.  
Ensuring that public funds are appropriately used to leverage private 
funds without substituting private investment will depend on the stage of 
development of the technology and the size of the ‘technology death risk 
area’ (see Figure 2.1). Figure 2.2 presents a decision-making structure on 
the selection of the share of grant, loan and private financing sources. 
This is a normal investment decision flow based on pure financial 
return logic. The internal rate of return (IRR) and risk level of projects will 
determine the size, type and share of public support. Once a project is 
considered as having a high economic rate of return (ERR), the level of 
support needed should be decided upon. For fundamental research that is 24 | CLOSING THE EU FINANCING GAP FOR INNOVATION 
 
by nature not profitable, at least in the foreseeable future, grant financing is 
the only possibility. For applied industrial research there may be some 
scope for EIB loans, as the research is expected to result in marketable 
products with a profit return in the future. Nevertheless, depending on the 
risk and timescale, mainly grant-based mechanisms are going to be possible. 
At the stages of final prototype and demonstration, EIB loans become 
possible depending on the risk level, a blend of grants and loans can be 
envisaged.  
Figure 2.2.Selection criteria for level of support 
 
Source: European Investment Bank. 
 
The EIB also issues project bonds, one form of credit enhancement 
that could be used to finance ring-fenced projects. Through its borrowing 
activity, the EIB could issue specific bonds earmarked to support the Bank’s 
priority. For instance, the EIB issues “climate awareness bonds” 
earmarking the proceeds from these bonds for EIB projects in the fields of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency. While these bonds do not target 
RD&I, they can be an additional instrument to channel funding for the 
deployment stages of those technologies. For the final stage of 
commercialisation of new technologies, the EIB may support the project, 
although where risks are low and the project is cash-flow generating, 
commercial loans should be favoured wherever possible. In addition to EIB 
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loans, the role of EIF instruments could be further explored for innovation 
at SME level. Generally, whatever the instrument, it is important not to 
substitute the private financial sector unnecessarily. 
One way to increase the multiplier effect of existing budgetary 
resources for the SET-plan could be with a guarantee instrument. A 
dedicated maturity enhancement instrument comprising or embedded in a 
guarantee facility could be established as a joint EU-EIB initiative to 
guarantee long-term EIB loans over part of their life, as considered under 
the new EU project bonds initiative. The EU budgetary funding would 
serve as a first-loss risk cover (which could be recycled if unused at the end 
of the guarantee), while the EIB covers the second-loss risk. This will 
mitigate the risk profile of the operation and at the same time release 
necessary capital on the EIB side. 
The selection procedures should ensure that there is no crowding out 
of the private sector. For the EU, there are indications that today’s 
instruments for RD&I support have in general been positive in this respect. 
According to Cox & Gagliardi (2009) from the JRC, EU public RD&I 
expenditure seems to have leveraged additional private investments. 
2.2.3  The Risk-Sharing Financing Facility 
An example of another tool for the financing of RD&I projects is the Risk-
Sharing Financing Facility (RSFF), addressing bankable RD&I projects for 
which the credit risk is perceived to be low or sub-investment grade. The 
EIB and the European Commission launched the RSFF in 2007. The EIB and 
the Commission each provide €1 billion as a capital cushion to cover the 
risks incurred for the provision of debt financing of approximately €10 
billion of loans under RSFF. This facility provides substantial additional 
debt finance to complement more conventional sources of finance such as 
grants, equity and loans. RSFF has shown convincing results to date, and 
by the end of 2010, loans worth almost €6.3bn were signed, with €3.5 billion 
disbursed (Figure 2). Energy projects accounted for 15% of RSFF signatures.  
The demand for RSFF loans for RD&I projects was positively 
evaluated by an expert group (European Commission, 2010e) and the 
success of the implementation of the RSFF recognised politically. The RSFF 
interim evaluation conducted in 2010 concluded with a very positive 
overall result, asking for a continuation of the RSFF, its improvement in 
terms of reaching certain target groups (SMEs, research infrastructures, 
universities) through more risk-taking on the EU side, the release of the 26 | CLOSING THE EU FINANCING GAP FOR INNOVATION 
 
second tranche of FP7 (€500 million) and an additional potential budgetary 
allocation until 2013, as well as potentially putting in place a "renewed 
RSFF" for the period 2014-2020, with a budget of €5 billion.  
As underlined in the context of the RSFF interim evaluation, the 
expansion of the size and scope of RSFF beyond its initial remit could be 
considered to support the acceleration of the financing of SET-plan projects. 
This was also flagged in the conclusions of the last European Council 
dedicated to energy and innovation calling for a scaling-up of RSFF. 
Presently there are limitations on the use of RSFF for SET-plan projects, due 
to eligibility restrictions. 
Due to its debt-based characteristics, RSFF could help finance the 
objectives while reducing some of the procedural difficulties of other 
‘grant-based’ financing mechanisms. 
Figure 2.3. Performance of the RSFF 
 
Source: European Investment Bank (2010). 
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The RSFF facility should thus be explored further as a solution to 
fund bankable projects, for which the credit risk is perceived to be 
low/sub-investment grade, for the testing and deployment of new 
technologies and in particular the SET-Plan initiatives. An instrument like 
the RSFF dedicated to energy could be developed. Such a debt or loan 
guarantee instrument is used successfully in the US, whose Department of 
Energy has a dedicated financial instrument for energy technologies. RSFF 
is also attractive to the private sector because they are exempt from the 
stringent nature of FP7 agreements and in particular from the IPR 
obligations. Another positive aspect of the loans is that it will allow further 
separation of the projects which are pre-commercial and need grants from 
those where appropriate risk-sharing mechanisms can offer enough 
incentives to the private sector to invest. The more stringent nature of 
grants can ensure that the right balance between grants and loans is kept. It 
is thus recommended, that while grant procedures should be adapted to 
the needs of research, those grants maintain high requirements to avoid 
using grant subsidies unnecessarily. The RSFF tool can also be designed as 
a self-sustaining mechanism, by making it a revolving mechanism whereby 
the (unutilised portion of) capital provisions released after the repayment 
of loans are reinvested in the scheme, to provide risk coverage for other 
eligible loans.  
RSFF is currently being explored as a means to support SET-Plan 
technologies. It excludes financing for nuclear research, owing to a lack of 
political consensus on this technology.  
As a comparison of loan guarantee programmes, Box 2.1 presents the 
US system, which gives an appreciation of the gap in the effort invested 
between the EU and the US in the area of guarantees.  
 
Box 2.1 US Department of Energy’s loan guarantee program 
The US Department of Energy’s loan guarantee program aims to accelerate 
the commercial deployment of technologies that reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases and employ new or significantly improved technologies. 
While the program does not support research and development, it is 
intended to support promising technologies that, because they are new to 
the market, are unable to obtain conventional private financing. The 
program covers a broad range of innovative technologies, including energy 
efficiency, smart grids, renewables, CCS and nuclear energy.  28 | CLOSING THE EU FINANCING GAP FOR INNOVATION 
 
The Department of Energy’s loan program has so far committed nearly $18 
billion to support 20 clean energy projects, plans additional commitments in 
the coming months, and has requested the US Congress to provide funding 
to support more than $40 billion in additional future projects. Examples of 
projects include: 
-  A biodiesel project intended to triple the amount of renewable diesel 
produced domestically;  
-  Two of the world’s largest solar thermal projects;  
-  A 2,200 megawatt (MW) nuclear power plant – US first Generation III 
project; and 
-  The world’s largest wind farm with a generating capacity of 845 MW  
Projects are selected according to various criteria, including the quality of 
risk allocation, the robustness of the economic model and the comfort 
provided by sponsors to lenders and the Department of Energy. DOE 
support is intended to be diversified, both in terms of technologies and 
business models (merchant plant, regulated utilities) supported. Main 
measures either consist of economic incentives, risk mitigation or guarantees 
designed to secure sponsors and/or lenders.  
2.3  Increasing the contribution by the EU budget 
While there is potential to increase the multiplier effect of EU funds there is 
still a need to ensure that sufficient funding is available for those areas of 
RD&I where grants are necessary, such as basic and early state research 
and demonstration. It is then necessary to find funding for the loan 
provisioning and credit-enhancement instruments as provided by public 
and private financing institutions. 
If one looks at the present €3 billion per year distribution of funding 
in RD&I for the SET-Plan technologies, we find roughly a 10-20-70 ratio 
between EU support, national public funding and private investment. 
Increasing the amount of investment by an additional €5 billion per year 
will necessarily alter this distribution.  
If we assume that the market deployment of technologies starts with 
the most profitable and less risky, expanding investment capacity means 
entering into higher risk, longer-term and maybe lower profitability areas 
of technology. The higher the level of RD&I and hence the risk profile of 
the project, the lower the incentive of the private sector to intervene. This 
indicates a proportionally higher increase in funding by the public sector. THE SET-PLAN | 29 
 
In addition, the development of new technologies in the energy sector is to 
a large extent an EU public good requiring coordination at EU level to 
generate the economies of scale. As such, the increase in public support 
should be highest at EU level followed by national and private funding. 
Investments in energy technology will have an important impact on energy 
security and the economy, both being of high importance for member states, 
which should themselves increase their investments. However, public 
national funding should increase most, due to the New Entrants Reserve 
(NER300) of the ETS, which will allow member states to spend 
approximately €1.5 billion in demonstration projects between 2013 and 
2015, see section 2.5. To ensure additionality this should be on top of the 
present expenditure of around €1.1 billion. 
The first point indicates that there is a higher role for the EU to play 
in fostering new energy technologies, thus the share in public spending 
would need to grow proportionally more for the EU than for the national 
budgets and both more than the private sector. This would mean that to 
reach an annual €8 billion budget we would, for example, have to consider 
a distribution of around 25-35-40: €2 billion by the EU, €2.8 billion by 
member states and € 3.2 billion from the private sector. This would be 
equivalent to a €1.7 billion increase by the EU, €1.7 billion by member states 
and around €1billion by the private sector. These figures are indicative and 
can vary substantially, but a change in the distributional share of the 
burden has to be envisaged. The shares would need to be revised post-2015 
depending on the existence or not of an NER. 
Through innovative financial mechanisms it is possible to increase 
the private sector leverage, but there are limitations. If the present RSFF €2 
billion provisioning facility by the EU budget and EIB were to be fully used 
for energy projects (which it is not) and assuming an average project cycle 
of ten years (which is conservative) with a leverage factor of 1 to 5, the 
mobilised funding represents €10 billion in EIB investment in ten years, 
knowing that the EIB is only financing up to 50% of the total investment 
cost. This is probably at least €30 billion short of the additional €50 billion 
over the next ten years.14 Of course, the RSFF is not the only EIB lending 
                                                      
14 As the EIB only covers a maximum of 50%, a €10 billion loan will leverage a 
minimum of €10 billion from the private or public sector (can be combined with 
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instrument; there are other standard loans to R&D which it provides at 
favourable interest rates due to the banks’ credit rating. Nevertheless, the 
RSFF is supposed to cover those investments that would not be covered by 
standard investment rate loans. 
It is important to have RD&I-oriented investments aimed at the needs 
for bridge financing needed in costly, large-scale and long maturity energy 
R&D. It would be advisable to create a dedicated product within the risk 
financing facility, such as the renewed RSFF mentioned earlier, specifically 
for energy technologies, which could leverage up to 2 to 3 billion euro a 
year in investment. Then the EU budget could provide an additional grant 
investment of €1 billion a year. Other funding dedicated to energy RD&I 
from different funds, both EU and national, can provide the remaining 
public funding, including other loan and risk guarantee facilities. 
The cost to the EU budget for RD&I in energy would rise 
approximately by €2 billion a year, which could come from redirecting 
funds from other budgetary headings. To put it into perspective, this 
represents approximately 1.5% of the present size of the EU budget. 
2.4  Project bonds 
The expansion of loan guarantee instruments can be complemented with 
EU project bonds for specific late stage more mature long-term projects. 
These have been proposed in the Europe 2020 strategy by the European 
Commission. More precisely the aim is to recourse to bonds for the 
financing of projects as one financial instrument to address the funding 
needs of major infrastructure projects, with the bonds being issued by 
project companies. The objective of this approach is to attract additional 
private sector financing for individual infrastructure projects via a 
mechanism for enhancing the credit rating of bonds issued by a project 
company. Leveraging on existing EU funds, it is designed to act as a 
catalyst to re-open the debt capital market (currently largely untapped for 
infrastructure investments following the financial crisis) as a significant 
source of financing in the infrastructure sector. 
                                                                                                                                       
grants). It is not possible to know the share of the €10 billion, which will actually be 
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However, project bonds do not need to be limited to infrastructures; 
they could also be considered for pan-European demonstration and 
deployment projects for new energy technologies when the costs are high 
and timeframes long. An example of bonds which can potentially be used 
for deployment of technologies is the EIB’s “climate awareness bond”, 
which is focused on investments in climate protection which includes, for 
example, deployment of renewables. 
2.5  The NER 300  
A major new source of financial support for renewables at the EU level – 
though outside the EU budget – is the so-called NER 300 programme, 
established under Article 10a(8) of the Emissions Trading Directive 
2003/87/EC. NER300 is a funding programme for the demonstration of 
low-carbon technologies at commercial scale and aims to co-fund at least 34 
innovative renewable energy technology demonstration projects in the 
territories of the EU member states, together with at least eight CCS 
demonstration projects. At current prices of EU ETS allowances, the 
programme will provide around €4.5 billion of co-funding, and will 
leverage a matching funding from industry and member states of the same 
magnitude. 15   The Commission launched the first Call for Proposals 
comprising 200 million allowances under the NER300 programme in 
November 2010, the award decision is expected in the second half of 2012.16 
The NER300 funding raised by the Commission via issuing ETS 
allowances certificates is expected to be supplemented by MS contributions 
subject to state aid assessment and clearance by the Commission of the 
public funding contribution. Projects benefiting from NER300 support 
could raise additional funding from other sources (e.g. commercial loans, 
EIB loans). The investment value of projects supported through the 
proceeds of the  NER30 0 programme is  ex pected to  be a  mu ltiple of the  
equivalent allowances depending on the actual sales price of the certificate 
and on the true perimeter of the relevant cost identified in the regulation. 
The NER300 process is planned to last until 2013 but the actual 
implementation period might be longer, depending on factors such as the 
                                                      
15 See Commission Decision 2010/670/EU of 6.11.2010, OJ L 290, p. 39. 
16   OJ C 302, 9.11.2010, p. 4, further information is available at: 
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type of projects funded, potential administrative and operational delays for 
the completion of the project. 
2.6  Innovation/Technology Accelerator 
The European Commission (2010b) has recently proposed the creation of an 
“innovation/technology accelerator” under the EU ETS. This new 
mechanism would support early investors in top performing low-carbon 
technologies by rewarding them with additional free allowances, i.e. a 
potentially similar structure as the NER 300 in terms of governance but not 
in the Directive. It is worth noting that this could be a deviation from the 
present aim to keep a technology-neutral approach, avoiding picking 
winners. The primary aim is to strengthen the reward for fast movers, i.e. 
benefits beyond the carbon price effect. Such a mechanism could work 
through the benchmarking system of allocating free allowances to industry 
sectors and would have to rely on surplus allowances left over within the 
maximum available amount, i.e. once the allocation is complete. These 
extra allowances would then help finance the investments by companies 
that commit to out-perform the relevant sector benchmark or to make rapid 
advances towards it, such as by improving carbon intensity. Whether the 
innovation/technology accelerator is ultimately introduced and what its 
operational details will be is still a matter of discussion. 
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3.  HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL OF THE 
SET-PLAN THROUGH POLICY 
COHERENCE 
he SET-Plan is not a stand-alone, self-contained policy. While finance 
is essential, success will also depend on governance of innovation in 
the broader sense of raising well-known issues of excessive 
bureaucracy, provisions for intellectual property rights (IPRs) and notably 
a more trusting and risk-tolerant approach to EU research funding. 
Harnessing synergies with other EU policies such as regional policy, public 
procurement or state aid policy will also prove instrumental. 
3.1  Reforming the management of EU innovation and research 
policy  
The SET-Plan has been conceived to be open and with variable architecture 
focusing equally on market development, science and technology. The 
main challenges are to find the right balance between the public and 
private sector in guiding the decisions of the initiative. This will require the 
European Commission to adopt a different way of management than it 
follows for example in the field of research funding, notably avoiding 
bureaucratic practices and political influence. 
The expert group that performed the mid-term evaluation found the 
grant and basic research components of the FP7 programmes well 
developed in general and pronounced them a success (European 
Commission, 2010e), despite problems in the administrative and financial 
structures. However, industry’s evaluation seems to contradict this finding, 
evidenced by the falling rate of industry participation in EU research 
programmes, mainly as a result of real or perceived bureaucracy or issues 
surrounding intellectual property rights.  
The expert group’s enthusiasm is more subdued in the areas that the 
SET-Plan considers a priority, namely going from the basic results of RD&I 
towards a deployable and commercially viable product, for example 
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through the Joint Technology Platforms (JTIs). SMEs, which might be 
prepared to consider expanding their innovation practices using EU 
opportunities, consider the present assistance too focused on pre-
commercial RD&I, and not enough on the later stages of demonstration, 
testing, innovation, systems integration and initial deployment.  
To improve the performance of the funds and make them better 
adapted to the nature of RD&I, there is a need to reform the Financial 
Regulation of the EU, which presently is too rigid and risk-averse. It is 
based on public procurement rules that focus on process rather than 
outputs. The Carvalho Report from the European Parliament (2010) 
identifies the need to change the nature of the rules, focusing on more 
outputs and increasing flexibility, and calls for the Commission to make the 
Framework Programme compatible with a ‘science-based’ activity. 
The report also calls for a higher rate of tolerable risks of error (TRE), 
as RD&I is by nature full of unknowns. In particular it calls for more 
flexibility in accounting rules, accepting more flexible cost estimations. 
Evaluations of the EU research and development policy consistently 
mention the lack of participation of the corporate sector and SMEs in EU 
RD&I programmes. Industry and SME participation in EU research 
programmes has been steadily falling. This trend is largely attributable to 
two causes. 
The first relates to the provisions governing IPRs, whereby industry 
generally is not often awarded the rights coming out of the research 
programme. This is largely irrelevant for basic research but matters 
considerably when research moves closer to the commercialisation stage. 
The present system largely ignores the mixed academic and commercial 
structures of the research institutes in Europe. This undermines the 
incentive for industry to participate by investing its own money. This 
situation – which is far from being an EU/EEA problem – could be 
overcome by more appropriate rules that better reflect the stage of 
development from basic R&D, demonstration and deployment and the role 
and risk incurred by private investors.  
The second main criticism from industry but also from other 
stakeholders is the actual or perceived magnitude of bureaucratic 
requirements which discourage participation. This ‘excessive bureaucracy’ 
problem concerns both the pre-formulation and implementation phases. 
During the pre-formulation phase of a project, potential participants can 
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project. During implementation, participants complain about a 
multiplication of financial control rules and onerous reporting procedures. 
The Framework programmes are heavily focused on procedure rather than 
the final result.  
The use of price-based or ‘lump sum’ selection methods with much 
lower requirements on cost estimations should be considered in exchange 
for much higher requirements on the quality of the results. The Carvalho 
report calls for the elimination of cumbersome and unproductive 
procedures, such as timesheet completion. 
It also mentions the need to simplify and streamline the multitude of 
“programmes (e.g. FP, CIP, Structural Funds) and associated instruments 
(JTIs, Article 187 initiatives, PPPs, Article 185 projects, KICs, Era-net, etc.)” 
(p. 24). This could be combined with a streamlining of pre-formulation 
procedures.  
3.2  Harnessing synergies between the SET-Plan technologies and 
the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds 
The EU Structural and Cohesion Funds will have an important influence in 
determining the infrastructure of many regions and countries. The regions 
and countries benefiting from those funds have an opportunity to install 
the energy systems of the future. New, existing and future technologies, 
from renewable energies to smart grids, require more flexible and 
integrated energy distribution systems. Introducing the right infrastructure 
now will allow these countries to benefit from the new technologies 
without the large opportunity costs and problems that regions with more 
recent but incompatible infrastructure face. The development of the right 
infrastructures of large areas of the EU will also considerably reduce the 
barriers and costs of deploying SET-Plan technologies, creating a win-win 
situation for the regions, the technology developers and the EU as a whole. 
More entrepreneurial regions could combine EU funding for 
Cohesion with the need for large-scale testing and deployment of new 
technologies, such as the deployment of smart-grids with new renewable 
energy sources on a regional scale (e.g. Núñez Ferrer et al., 2009). Regions 
with infrastructures that need upgrading could take advantage of the 
benefits of being at the forefront of new developments, which could result 
in considerable economic benefits both in the short and long term. 
Regions in need of upgrading their energy infrastructure should be 
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requirements, to avoid considerably increased opportunity costs in the 
future for the necessary integration of new systems. Energy systems are 
one of the backbones of the economy and mistakes in this area can affect 
growth prospects. In any case, climate proofing of EU-financed 
programmes should be a prerequisite (see Núñez Ferrer et al., 2009). EU-
funded policies should not run counter to climate change objectives. 
While coherence with EU Cohesion Policy is central, the same logic 
applies to a different degree to rural development and agricultural policy, 
for example biofuels and biogas deployment.  
3.3  Public procurement 
The choice of materials and technologies for EU-funded projects is 
important. EU public procurement rules could become a powerful 
instrument to pull technologies into the market. Public procurement, i.e. 
the purchase of goods, services and public works by governments and 
public utilities is very significant, amounting, according to the European 
Commission, to some 19% of the EU’s GDP (2008 data). No figures exist as 
to the share of energy technologies of total EU public procurement, but it is 
certainly not insignificant. Traditionally in the EU, public procurement law 
has aimed at preventing member state authorities at local, state or federal 
level from discriminating against potential suppliers or service providers 
from other EU member states. Contrary to other countries such as the US, 
EU public procurement has not been used to support new technologies or 
to steer technological development, e.g. through defence contracts. More 
recently, public procurement is considered as a tool to support ‘green’ 
technologies, i.e. technologies with a generally lower ecological footprint. 
DG Environment of the European Commission has identified on its website 
what it calls “green public procurement” (GPP) as a tool to “stimulate a 
critical mass of demand for more sustainable goods and services which 
otherwise would be difficult to get onto the market” and concludes that 
GPP is “therefore a strong stimulus for eco-innovation”. In the same vein, 
GPP could also be a tool to be developed for SET-Plan technologies. 
3.4  Coherence of state aid between the EU and member states  
The objective of state aid control is to ensure that government interventions 
do not distort competition and trade inside the EU. State aid is defined as 
an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to 
undertakings by national, i.e. member state, public authorities. As a result THE SET-PLAN | 37 
 
this covers support to research and innovation. In principle, state aid is 
prohibited unless it is judged that in some circumstances, government 
interventions are necessary for a well-functioning and equitable economy, 
leaving room for a number of policy objectives with which state aid can be 
considered compatible. The European Commission, as guardian of the 
Treaty, is in charge of monitoring and controlling state aid policy, as 
established by the legislator. Accordingly, the European Commission has 
elaborated a system of rules under which state aid is monitored and 
assessed in the European Union. This legal framework is regularly 
reviewed to respond to changing circumstances and to improve its 
efficiency.  
The development of technologies under the SET-Plan has led to a 
situation in which EU state aid rules allow the European Commission to 
provide a higher level of state aid under the programmes that it manages 
than it allows for member states to provide under EU state aid rules. This 
constitutes a restriction, which is difficult to justify. Since the Treaty, 
however, allows for state aid rules to be lifted for “aid to promote the 
execution of an important project of common  European interest (…)” 
(TFEU Article 107 3(b)), there is a possibility to consider special exceptions 
to the state aid rules for specific RD&I developments in the area of energy 
or other technologies to align the level of admissible state aid between 
member states and the European Commission. It seems appropriate that 
the European Commission addresses these issues and identifies the areas 
where and when the state aid rules may be aligned between member states 
and EU programmes. 38 | 
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APPENDIX 1. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AND TECHNICAL TERMS 
Bank guarantee: A financial backing which protects the lender from losses 
incurred if the debtor defaults. 
Bridge capital: Financial support for the development of an R&D result into 
a commercially viable product. 
CCS: Carbon capture and storage  
Debt financing: Another term for loans. Companies use debt financing when 
taking up loans. The EIB offers loans for private companies (debt 
financing), directly or through intermediary commercial banks.  
First-loss risk: In structured finance, the losses on a transaction, or a 
portfolio, are distributed to various parties. Losses up to a defined 
limit will first be borne (by writing off capital, foregoing interest, or 
otherwise) by a certain class. In the case of the RSFF, this is taken over 
by a €1 billion guarantee of the EU budget and the EIB. This is called 
the first-loss risk. Subsequent risk may be divided further, in this case 
second-loss risk beyond the €1 billion and up to €2 billion are taken 
over the EIB. 
Grant: Non-refundable financial assistance 
GPP: Green public procurement 
IPRs: Intellectual Property Rights 
Internal rate of return (IRR): Economic returns of a project over its lifetime, 
net costs 
Economic rate of return (ERR): The economic rate of return is similar to the 
IRR, but incorporates the value of the social benefits of the project, 
which do not accrue to the promoter 
ITER: International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor 
JTI: Joint Technology Platform  
NER: New entrants reserve 
PPP: Public Private Partnerships THE SET-PLAN | 41 
 
Risk-sharing:  Sharing financial risks with promoters, which reduces the 
capital costs of loans 
RD&I: Research Development and Innovation 
RSFF : Risk-sharing finance facility  
SME: Small and medium-sized enterprise 
TRE: Tolerable risk of error 
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APPENDIX 2. ESTIMATED FINANCIAL NEEDS 
European Commission’s technology road map assessment of financial needs 
(2010-20) 
European industrial initiatives  € millions 
Wind energy  6000 
New turbines and components  2500 
Offshore structure related technologies  1200 
Grid integration  2100 
Resource assessment, spatial planning  200 
Solar energy  16000 
PV Systems  5500 
Integration of PV generated electricity  3500 
CSP increase efficiency & reduce costs  4400 
Increase dispatchability  1700 
Improve environmental footprint  800 
Longer-term R&D  100 
Bioenergy  8900 
Optimisation of pathways  7900 
Biomass feedstock support  600 
Longer-term R&D  400 
Carbon capture and storage  10500-16500 
Demonstration 8500-13000 
New CCS technology development  2000-3500 
Electricity grid  2000 
Network technologies  1200 
Long-term evolution  100 
Active customers  600 
Innovative market designs  100 THE SET-PLAN | 43 
 
Sustainable nuclear energy  5000-10000 
Prototype sodium fast reactor  2000-4000 
Demonstrator alternative fast reactor  600-800 
Supporting infrastructures  1450-2650 
Cross-cutting R&D programme  1000-2000 
Smart cities  10000-12000 
New buildings & refurbishment  Not specified 
Energy networks  Not specified 
Transport Not  Specified 
TOTAL  58400-71400 
Source: European Commission (2009b). 
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